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Abstract 
 
The Lehman failure precipitated the Great Recession and forced economic 
policy into unchartered terrain.  This paper provides a retrospective on the 
policy response and links to the underwhelming economic recovery.  The 
exposition is kept non-technical to facilitate wider access.  Contrary to 
perceptions that banks remain vulnerable, this paper argues that regulation 
strengthened U.S. banks across a variety of dimensions.  The deleveraging 
involved in the transition to stronger banks tightened financial conditions and 
offset the significant monetary stimulus.  The failure to fully capture these 
offsetting policy forces explains the systematic forecasting errors—both markets 
and the Fed have consistently overestimated the strength of the economic cycle.  
Quantitative Easing resulted in a ballooning of excess reserves in the banking 
system, but payment of interest on excess reserves helped bank recapitalisation. 
The combination of stronger banks and excess reserves has the potential, unlike 
in previous cycles, to drive a late cycle surge in growth. 
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Part I: The Policy Response 
As we approach a decade following the tumultuous events unleashed by 
the failure of Lehman, it makes sense to take stock analytically.  The fallout 
from the Lehman failure has been traumatic and long lasting.  It precipitated the 
                                                        
* The author is grateful to Chris Rokos for discussions on this topic over an extended period 
of time.  I would also like to thank Charles Brendon, John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, 
Srichander Ramaswamy and Bob Rowthorn for discussions on the subject.  The views 
expressed are solely the author’s. 
 2 
Great Recession, tripped economic policy into unchartered waters and spilled 
over into the politics of the West. 
Much has been written about the bank failure both in the popular media 
and in the sophisticated financial press.  The popular rendition links the crisis to 
the wilful greed of bankers.  The more sophisticated narrative acknowledged 
human failure and malfeasance, but drew attention to deeper forces.  The drive 
to broaden home ownership in the United States; the capacity of the banks to 
leverage it in their own interests; and the failure of policy to grasp the 
destructive force of highly interconnected banks with thin capital cushions.  
Surprisingly, for an event that had a systemic impact on the economy, 
policy and the markets, the analytical stock taking of the crisis and its aftermath 
has been somewhat thin.  This paper delves deeper into the policy response 
following the systemic bank failure to provide insights into why growth and 
inflation have been muted following the Great Recession when compared to 
past recoveries. It also examines the implications of Quantitative Easing (QE) 
for the banking system’s excess reserves and what that portends for future 
economic performance. 
Making these assessments requires a deeper understanding of the 
interactions among monetary, fiscal and financial policies.   The metrics used to 
capture fiscal and monetary policies are transparent; we look at the cyclically 
adjusted budget balance for fiscal policy and interest rates and central bank 
asset purchases for monetary policy.  The metrics to capture financial 
conditions/policy—i.e. the capacity of the banking system to intermediate 
maturity and liquidity transformations—are much less transparent.  Hence, 
macroeconomists often ignore the impact of financial policy on growth and 
inflation and focus instead on the impact of monetary and fiscal policies.  
 
The focus of the first part is to correct this bias by looking more deeply 
into financial policy.  It offers metrics to capture how financial conditions have 
evolved and interacted with monetary and fiscal policies.  The focus is primarily 
on the United States to keep the discussion tractable. 
 
The main conclusions are that the regulatory changes instituted in the 
post-Lehman period broadly tightened financial conditions till recently; together 
with the tighter fiscal policy since 2011, it is shown to have offset the 
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substantial monetary easing since 2008.  The offsetting effects of monetary and 
financial policies appear largely to explain the underwhelming economic 
recovery following the Great Recession.  The regulatory tightening of financial 
conditions after the Lehman failure is, however, shown to have gradually 
strengthened the banking system over time.  The resulting enhanced capacity of 
the banks to intermediate in the future has the potential to extend the recovery.   
 
In other words, while the effect of bank regulation dampened growth and 
inflation until recently, it could amplify them in the future.  These effects of 
regulation—both actual and expected—have been unintended; regulatory policy 
did not consciously seek these effects.  It has rather been a bi-product of 
attempts to strengthen the banking system.  Should fiscal policy turn 
expansionary, as appears likely now, the financial accelerator will amplify the 
fiscal stimulus.  The banking system has the space to increase lending late into 
the cycle—a starkly different dynamic from most previous cycles.  The second 
section shows how excess reserves have been built up in the banking system as 
a consequence of QE.  The policy adopted by the Fed to pay interest on excess 
reserves after the Lehman event is shown to have aided the recapitalisation of 
the banking system.  The combination of stronger banks and excess reserves 
could have the potential to strengthen and extend the late cycle recovery.  That 
has important implications for monetary policy and the markets as it indicates 
that the impact of QE could transition from largely influencing assets prices (as 
it has so far) to impacting the real economy through credit creation.  
 
I.2. Perspectives on Post-Lehman Policies 
 
A retrospective on post-Lehman policies should be useful to understand 
how financial conditions have evolved.  The first order policy response to the 
stresses associated with the failure of Lehman was to ease monetary and 
financial conditions.  Fed funds were eased from 5.25% to essentially zero 
between August 2007 and December 2008.  This was followed by large scale 
asset purchases – QE1 in March 2009, QE2 in November 2010, operation twist 
in September 2011 and QE3 in September 2012.  While asset purchases began 
to be tapered in December 2013 and ended in October 2014, monetary policy 
continued to be expansionary throughout this period as the stock of assets held 
by the Fed grew, reaching around $4.5 trillion – a massive increase.  The 
totality of the monetary stimulus through cuts in the Fed Funds rate and large 
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scale asset purchases between 2007 and 2014 was unprecedented. The gradual 
hikes in the Fed funds rate since December 2015 has perhaps made only a small 
dent on the easy monetary conditions. 
 
As the financial system seized up, financial policy complemented 
monetary policy during 2008-09 to keep the system operational.  The Term 
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the Capital Purchase Program 
(CPP) to inject capital into the banking system, the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility (CPFF), the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) and 
the FDIC’s guarantees of all checking deposits and the insurance of new senior 
debt kept the financial system whole and constituted an easing of credit 
conditions1. 
 
Fiscal policy also complemented monetary and financial policies in 
providing support for the economy after the Lehman failure.  The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed in February 2009 provided a fiscal 
stimulus of $787 billion.  The cyclically adjusted general government deficit as 
a percentage of potential output (a good proxy for the fiscal impulse) rose from 
about 4% in 2007 to about 9.5% in 2010 – a significant fiscal expansion. 
 
That is, the cumulative support from monetary, fiscal and financial 
policies was significant in the couple of years following Lehman’s collapse.  It 
needed to be given the massive contractionary forces on the economy.  This 
policy response explains the rapid stabilisation of financial and economic 
conditions during 2009-10. 
 
I.3. Bank Regulation and its Implications 
 
The first order objective following the failure of Lehman was to prevent a 
re-run of the Great Depression. There is always an intrinsic conflict between the 
lender of last resort function of the central bank and moral hazard.  During a 
financial implosion it is catastrophic to get obsessed with moral hazard. 
However, once the financial system had stabilized, as in 2010, it does make 
                                                        
1 Bernanke (2015) provides an extensive documentation of these initiatives. 
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sense to deal with moral hazard2.  Fiscal policy was also tightened after 2010.  
This was a reflection of the political perception that a lack of fiscal discipline 
was a factor leading to the crisis.  The cyclically adjusted general government 
deficit as a percentage of potential GDP contracted from about 9.5% in 2010 to 
4% in 2016—a gradual but significant fiscal tightening. 
 
On financial policy, a swath of regulations was initiated both in the 
United States and globally to curb excessive risk taking by banks.  There were 
three main aspects to the regulatory initiatives.  The first was to make sure that 
the egregious practices that led to the crisis were punished.  The second was to 
make sure that the gaps in regulation were tightened so that the banking system 
could not arbitrage the regulatory system.  The third was to ensure that the 
banking system had significant capital and liquidity cushions—both in quantity 
and quality—to withstand the next crisis. 
 
The costs to the banks from fines to clean up past violations were 
substantial.  The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report estimates that for the 
Global systemically important banks (GSIB) the cumulative litigation expenses 
constituted 27% of the underlying net income for the European banks and 19% 
for the U.S. banks.  Regulation also forced a clean-up of the legacy assets.  
Non-core assets of the GSIB came down from 12% of all assets to 5%; for U.S. 
banks it came down from 12 to 3%.  The fines and the clean-up weighed on 
bank profitability and lending, though much of that now appears to be behind. 
 
There has been a strong sense among policymakers that the regulatory 
changes entailed by the move from Basel I to Basel II in 2004 incentivised 
banks to arbitrage the regulatory framework with unintended macro 
consequences that culminated in the financial crisis3.  The Basel I framework 
associated the riskiness of bank assets by whether it was public or private.  The 
key innovation in Basel II was to delink risk-weights from the public-private 
mix and link it instead to the external credit rating of the asset.  So, a corporate 
bond that was rated AAA had a risk weight of 20% under Basel II as opposed to 
100% under Basel I—a material difference for bank lending.  Another important 
                                                        
2 A detailed discussion of the issues connected with moral hazard can be found in King 
(2016). 
3 See BIS (2017).   Also see Ramaswamy (2017) and Bayoumi (2017) for a detailed 
discussion of the regulatory issues connected with Basel Standards. 
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change under Basel II was a reduction of risk-weights for collateralised 
residential mortgages from 50 to 35%.  
 
The rules for holding securitized assets and the capital treatment of off-
balance sheet exposures under Basel II were eased substantially. Banks could 
securitize their assets and hold them in off-balance sheet vehicles with literally 
no capital commitments.  This was the crux of the structure that blind-sided 
regulators and blew up the banking system in 2008—essentially, banks could 
create sub-prime mortgages with little capital commitment. 
 
Basel III consequently adopted a heavy hand in cleaning up the 
aberrations of Basel II.  The experience of Northern Rock, showed that financial 
stress could also emanate from the liability side of the banks—i.e. how a bank 
funded itself.  The exclusive focus of both Basel I and Basel II were on risk 
managing the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet.  Basel III regulated liability 
management by introducing new standards for liquidity management.  Banks 
are now expected to hold adequate stocks of high quality liquid assets to 
manage the cash outflows associated with short-term financial stress.  Chart 1 
shows the dramatic impact of this regulation on bank balance sheets.  Core 
deposits which were just under 50% of total liabilities of US banks in 2008 have 
now increased to over 70%.  On the asset side, the share of risk-free assets 
(essentially cash and treasuries) in total loans and leases, which was as low as 
7% in 2007 rose to as high as 30% in 2014 and is now at just over 25%.  These 
constitute fundamental changes in U.S. bank balance sheets in the post-Lehman 
period. 
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Chart 1.  Changes in U.S. Bank Balance Sheets (percent) 
 
Source: FDIC 
 
The combination of fines, restructuring charges, the reduction in market 
related functions and the growing share of risk-free assets on the balance sheet 
all added up to reducing bank profitability.  Chart 2 shows that the return on 
equity of the U.S. banks which was between 12-14% prior to the crisis has 
come down to around 8-10% in recent years, just about meeting the cost of 
equity, and constituted a tightening of financial conditions.  
 
 
Chart 2: Return on Equity of U.S. Commercial Banks (percent) 
 
Source: FDIC 
 
Basel III also made significant changes to the extent of regulatory capital 
that banks required.  Superficially, Basel III set the minimum total capital 
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requirement as a share of risk-weighted assets to be the same as under Basel II, 
i.e. at 8%.  However, regulatory capital is now defined stringently, forcing 
banks to raise the share of higher quality capital.  Tier 1 capital ratio has to be at 
least 6%; moreover, Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital—essentially 
common shares and retained earnings—has to constitute 4.5% of risk-weighted 
assets.  Beyond the minimum capital requirements, additional capital 
requirements are imposed under macro-prudential regulatory rules.  Banks are 
now expected to build a capital conservation buffer comprising CET1 
instruments of up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets during normal times.  A 
counter-cyclical CET1 buffer of up to 2.5% of risk-weighted assets can be 
imposed.  An additional capital buffer of up to 5% of risk-weighted assets has 
been proposed for systemically large financial institutions under Basel III.  All 
these capital buffers are expected to be operational by January 2019. 
 
Chart 3 shows the increase in total bank capital over risk-weighted assets 
for major U.S. banks following these regulatory initiatives.   
 
 
Chart 3. Evolution of Bank Capital Ratios for Major U.S. Banks (percent) 
 
Source: FRB, New York 
 
The capital ratio was around 12% before 2008, rose to about 16% by 2011 and 
is about 17% currently.  This broad ratio, however, masks the extent to which 
“effective” bank capital has been strengthened by post-Lehman regulatory 
requirements for high quality capital.  Under Basel II, goodwill, other intangible 
assets and tax-deferred assets were included under Tier 1 capital, but are 
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excluded under Basel III, making historical comparisons of total capital ratios 
an underestimation of the underlying strength of bank capital.  The New York 
Fed now provides a backdated time series of CET1 capital for the major banks 
in the United States and Chart 3 shows that it increased from just over 4% at the 
end of 2008 to about 13% currently.   
 
That is, the regulatory initiatives have almost tripled the high quality 
capital of the major banks—an increase of material significance.  Even these 
numbers underestimate the evolving underlying strength of the banks as there 
are more stringent risk-weights, especially for mortgages and contingent 
liabilities.  Viewed from this perspective, there has been an enormous 
strengthening of bank capital for the systemically large financial institutions in 
the United States, driven by the relatively close focus of regulation on the large 
banks.  The high quality capital has been raised through deleveraging and by 
issuing costly common equity, which tightened financial conditions in the 
transition phase, but will provide the capacity for future credit expansion. 
 
The impact of these regulation-driven changes in bank balance sheets, 
profitability and capital levels on the broader economy is multifaceted.  The 
large increase in the share of core deposits in bank liabilities will provide a 
cheaper and more stable funding for bank intermediation in the future.  This 
structural change in bank liability can be perceived as a prospective easing of 
financial conditions over the longer-run.  However, financial conditions were 
tightened in the transition process—i.e., in the short-to-medium run—as the 
more stable liability structure was achieved through a truncation of wholesale 
funding.  
 
The changes in the asset side of bank balance sheets tightened financial 
conditions unambiguously.  The large increase in the share of treasuries in bank 
balance sheets reduced the funds available to the private sector. Banks are a 
critical conduit for facilitating liquidity and maturity transformation in a market 
economy and regulation transformed them into passive buyers of government 
bonds.  As discussed, regulation also forced banks to raise high quality capital 
by deleveraging in the first instance.  While normative factors (the failure of the 
banks to manage their risk) justify the regulatory drive, its unintended effect 
was to slow down credit growth to the private sector and dampen the robustness 
of the post-Lehman recovery (Chart 4). 
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Chart 4: Ratio of Total Bank Loan Index to Nominal GDP Index (percent) 
 
Source: FRB New York and FRB St. Louis 
 
Chart 4, which captures how credit is behaving in relation to nominal 
GDP, reveals interesting trends.  The ratio of total bank loan index to nominal 
GDP index exploded between 2000-08, reflecting the booming economy, 
regulatory forbearance and regulatory arbitrage by the banks.  The sharp decline 
in this ratio in the immediate aftermath of Lehman is consistent with 
deleveraging for survival by the banks.  The regulatory drive to strengthen 
banks from 2011 drove this ratio further down and kept it at the lower level well 
into the end of 2015.  The Chart is interesting because looking at the credit/GDP 
ratio implicitly endogenizes the identification problem—i.e. we can side-step, in 
the first instance, the issue of whether changes in loan growth are demand 
constrained or supply driven.  The identification problem, of course, has to be 
settled econometrically ultimately.  There has been a paucity of academic 
econometric studies on the relationship between regulation, bank capital and 
credit availability, but this will be a fertile area of research going forward4.  
 
There is a gradual pick up in the ratio of total bank loan index to the 
nominal GDP index since 2016, with banks at the cusp of meeting regulatory 
targets.  As banks approach regulatory targets on capital and liquidity (they 
                                                        
4 The topic appears at this stage to be of more interest in policy circles than in academia.   A 
Bank of England Study (Aiyar, Calomiris and Wieldak, 2014) finds a strong negative 
statistical link between higher regulatory capital requirements and bank lending—in fact the 
effect seems almost as powerful as the monetary channel in the U.K.  An IMF study by Ben 
Naceeur and Roulet (2017) also finds a negative statistical relationship between higher 
regulatory capital requirement and lending in both the Eurozone and the U.S.  
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have passed stringent Fed stress tests in recent months), their capacity to 
intermediate strengthens.  At the cusp of reaching regulatory targets financial 
conditions morph from being tight to becoming loose.  The transition process 
from tight to loose is likely to be non-linear, because even if banks are just 
meeting new regulatory targets (Basel III), their underlying position is so much 
stronger than when they were at prior regulatory targets (Basel I and II).  
Consequently, easier financial conditions should accelerate into the future as 
banks build regulatory buffers and the economy strengthens. 
 
I.4. Summarising the Regulatory Implications 
 
The above analysis captures a strong and consistent theme of deleveraging 
by the banks and the meaningful strengthening of the quantity and quality of bank 
capital through regulation.  This has not got the attention that it deserves either 
from policy circles, the sophisticated financial press, or the academic literature.  
If anything, the popular perception seems to veer the other way around; banks 
still tend to be perceived as the cause of the crisis, the driver of the muted 
economic performance and as a risk to future growth, despite the significant 
transformations we have seen in the banking sector over the last decade.  
 
The analysis and conclusions of this part of the paper go against this 
conventional wisdom.  A closer look at how bank regulation has evolved and 
played out reveals the complexity with which financial policy has interacted with 
monetary policy.  The conundrum of low inflation amidst substantial monetary 
easing becomes much less of a puzzle once the headwinds from financial 
tightening arising from deleveraging and raising high quality capital are brought 
into the picture5.  The analysis has no normative agenda—i.e. there is no value 
judgement placed on whether the regulation should have happened or been done 
differently.  If anything, the paper is sympathetic to the need for regulatory 
changes given the traumatic events associated with the failure of Lehman.  The 
analysis has been entirely positivist in attempting to capture the evolving 
dynamics of financial regulation and its implications for the broader economy. 
The stronger capital base for the banks as a consequence of regulation will aid 
                                                        
5 The concept of deleveraging used here refers to banks reducing the level or speed of credit 
creation.  It is somewhat different from the way deleveraging is used in Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012) to describe the reduction of debt by households and firms in response to 
shocks.  Ultimately, it brings us back to the empirical identification problem, and this is 
likely to be a fertile area of research in evaluating the post-Lehman period. 
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future expansion; the banks now have the intrinsic capacity to accelerate loan 
growth into the late stage of the cycle—something that seldom happens at the 
mature phase of the upswing.  This theme is developed in greater detail below. 
 
Part II. QE, Excess Reserves and Its Economic Impact 
 
As discussed in Part I, the implosion of Lehman led in the first instance to 
significant monetary easing in the form of QE to support the economy, followed 
by regulation to prevent a repeat of the financial excesses.  While the focus of the 
previous section was on the economic implications of regulation, this part delves 
into the financial and economic implications of QE. 
 
The impact of QE on the economy has been relatively well documented 
by now. We have a good understanding of what the objectives of QE are and 
how bond purchases impact asset prices across the risk-spectrum6.  The Fed, for 
instance, has carried out detailed studies of the impact of QE, estimating that it 
has lowered 10-year bond yields by around 100 bps (Fischer, 2015).  The 
impact of QE on yields down the risk spectrum has no doubt been larger.  There 
are, of course, still open questions about the impact of QE—for instance, about 
how the relative impact of stocks versus flows influences asset prices and the 
economy.  That is, we still do not have a good handle on how much of the QE 
effects will continue to flow through from the expanded balance sheet of the 
central bank after asset purchases have been stopped; or, even as the stock of 
assets are gradually reduced, as is the case in the U.S currently.  After all, based 
on the Fed’s forward guidance for asset disposals, it would take roughly 4 more 
years for its balance sheet just to halve.  That could be a continuing source of 
monetary stimulus if the QE impact works as much through stocks of assets as 
it does through flows.  
 
A critical consequence of the QE programme has been the build-up of 
excess reserves in the banking system.  It has a significant impact on both the 
balance sheet and profitability of banks, and through that, on the broader 
economy.  This channel has received much less analytical focus because macro 
models tend to underplay the role of the banking channel.  While the focus of 
the analysis largely pertains to the U.S. economy, the analysis of excess 
reserves is also extended to the Eurozone.  Contrasting the excess reserves issue 
                                                        
6 Yellen (2013) provides a good summary of how QE is supposed to operate. 
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in the U.S. with that of the Eurozone provides a deeper understanding of the 
impact of QE in the U.S.  
 
II.2 Excess Reserves in the U.S. 
 
Reserve requirements are a critical ingredient of fractional banking—
which essentially encompasses most of the banking system in the world.  In the 
case of the U.S., the Fed requires all deposit taking institutions to hold 3% of 
any net transaction accounts between $15m and $104m and 10% of the accounts 
above $104m in reserves.  Before the financial crisis in 2007, total reserve 
balances in the U.S. banking system hovered around $15b, with excess reserves 
making less than $2b of this total.  These were held in the form of either vault 
cash or reserve balances with the Fed. 
 
As the Fed embarked on QE post the Lehman crisis, the purchases of 
treasuries and agency backed mortgage securities swelled the asset side of its 
balance sheet.  From a total asset base of about $869b in August 2007, the Fed’s 
assets expanded to $4.5t by December 2014, by the time asset purchases ended.  
As a consequence of the asset purchases reserve balances became the Fed’s 
single largest liability, at $2.6t by end 2014.  It has declined since then to $2.2t 
as of December 2017; excess reserves make up all but $0.1t of this total7. 
 
Since October 2008 the Fed has paid interest on the banks reserve 
balances.  For convenience we will call it interest on excess reserves (IOER)—
essentially almost all of the reserve balances are basically excess reserves at this 
juncture.  The Fed funds rate has generally been below the IOER.  The Fed 
currently has a range for the Fed funds rate of 25 bps, with the upper band being 
capped by IOER and the lower band bounded by the Fed’s Reverse Repurchase 
Agreement (RRP). 
 
The net income generated by U.S. banks from IOER is not 
straightforward to calculate, but we can make a rough estimate.  With IOER 
being 1.75% currently, the banking system reserves of around $2.1t should be 
able to generate an income of close to $35b annually—a significant contribution 
to bank net income and profitability.  With deposits paying little or no interest 
                                                        
7 A thorough analysis of the excess reserves issue is provided in Ihrig, Meade and Weinbach 
2015. 
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income, the IOER is a good approximation of net income generated by U.S. 
banks on reserve balances.  That constitutes just over 20% of the net income of 
U.S. banks, which were approximately $150b on average during the last three 
years. That is a significant contribution made by earnings on excess reserves to 
bank profitability and has potentially aided bank recapitalisation in the U.S. 
 
QE tends to be perceived as being detrimental to bank profitability as it 
lowers term premiums and thereby net interest income that banks can earn on 
riding the yield curve8.  This presumably happened to some extent, though the 
optics of the low long dated yields masks how much the banks could still eke 
out of the yield curve (net interest income is one of the largest contributors to 
bank profitability).  At the same time, banks benefitted greatly from IOER.  QE 
therefore indirectly helped to recapitalise the banks through the excess reserves 
channel, a factor that tends to be under-emphasized in discussions, and therefore 
prevented the harsh deleveraging that took place in the Eurozone.  The differing 
impact from the excess reserve channels on credit growth and bank strength in 
the U.S. and the Eurozone is discussed in greater detail below. 
 
II.3 Excess Reserves in the Eurozone 
 
QE, in the form of public sector asset purchases, was announced in 
January 2015 by the ECB.  The initial phase involved the purchase of €60b per 
month of sovereign bonds, which was increased to €80b in March 2016.  This 
was later pruned back to €60b in December 2016 and then to €30b per month in 
October 2017.  The QE programme is thus still ongoing, though with a lower 
velocity, and the ECB’s balance sheet is still expanding. 
 
As in the U.S., QE has been associated with growing excess reserves in 
the Eurozone.  At the end of 2014, before the official announcement of QE, 
excess reserves in the Eurozone was about €80b.  At the end of 2017, total 
reserves had risen to about €1.2t, with excess reserves constituting about €1.1t.   
 
Unlike in the U.S. where interest is paid on excess reserves, the negative 
deposit rate is applied to excess reserves in the Eurozone.  At today’s deposit 
rate of -40 bps, Eurozone banks will have to pay about €4.5b a year to the euro 
system central banks for holding excess reserves. 
                                                        
8 A good discussion of this issue is provided in the collection of articles in Den Haan (2016). 
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This is indeed a stark difference between the United States and the 
Eurozone.  While QE helped indirectly to increase profits and capitalise the 
banking system in the U.S., QE has imposed a cost on the Eurozone banks by 
reducing profitability and perhaps even depleting bank capital.  These effects 
have not necessarily been intentional.  The fear of deflation and the danger of 
replicating the Japanese experience in Europe forced the ECB into an 
aggressive form of monetary easing without paying sufficient heed to the 
collateral damage on banks and the second order effects on the economy.   
 
If excess reserves impose such a cost on the banking system in the 
Eurozone, why don’t the banks lend the money out rather than pay the ECB?  
There are two reasons.  First, demand constraints could be binding, and with the 
pervasive malaise in Europe, the lack of demand for loans has no doubt been a 
factor.  But even where demand constraints do not bite it is not costless for the 
banks to convert excess reserves into loans.  There are no capital charges on 
holding excess reserves and it helps the banks to meet the new statutory 
liquidity requirements.  Using excess reserves for making commercial loans 
would reduce liquidity buffers and incur capital charges and Eurozone banks 
have not only been short of capital but have had to meet the increasingly 
stringent capital requirements of Basel III.  That is, the Eurozone banks 
presumably found that paying up for excess reserves was less costly than 
making loans. 
 
II.4. QE, Asset Prices, Real Economy Lending 
 
The data appear consistent with the above discussion of how QE has 
interacted with excess reserves in the U.S. and the Eurozone.   Chart 5 shows 
that loan/GDP has fallen consistently in the Eurozone from the peak of 104% to 
about 88% recently; in contrast, following a period of significant deleveraging, 
the loan/GDP ratio stabilized in the U.S. by 2014 and started picking up 
thereafter. That is, the deleveraging by Eurozone banks continued long after it 
had stopped in the U.S.   
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Chart 5: Loans to GDP (percent) 
 
 
Source: FRB New York; ECB; IMF; Eurostat. 
 
The essential point is that QE in both the U.S and the Eurozone has had 
much more of an impact on asset prices than on the real economy, but for 
different reasons.  In the United States, QE combined with IOER contributed to 
raising bank profitability and aiding bank recapitalisation.  The issue really is at 
what stage do the excess reserves get deployed for lending to the real economy, 
which is ultimately the purpose of non-standard monetary policy.  The 
constraints, as always, are demand for loans and capital constraints for 
increasing banks’ loan portfolios.  With IOER paid by the Fed, we have the 
additional complication that an improvement in the economy that results in 
higher interest rates will generate more income for the banks without them 
having to commit capital—close to free money, as it were.  That is, for excess 
reserves to be productively deployed in the real economy we need the 
configuration of an increase in the demand for loans, banks exceeding their 
regulatory capital requirements and a return on lending to the real economy for 
the banks which exceeds IOER.  As the economy seems to be picking up speed 
and the Fed gradually reducing its balance sheet, there is a rising probability 
that this configuration materialises, but challenges persist.  
 
The Fed can incentivise lending to the real economy by stopping paying 
IOER; however, for that to happen the balance sheet of the Fed has to be 
reduced significantly.  Otherwise, the Fed is likely to lose control of the Fed 
Funds rate—that in fact is the key reason for IOER; bank recapitalisation has 
been a second-order effect.  Stopping payment of IOER is therefore likely to 
take time—banks will have to transition to a more balanced reserves position.  
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
84
88
92
96
100
104
108
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EA Loans, left axis
US Loans, right axis
 17 
However, despite this constraint, with the banking system close to meeting 
regulatory capital requirements and the economy picking up steam, the banking 
system has the ammunition over the next few years to increase intermediation 
significantly as and when lucrative lending opportunities arise (i.e., returns from 
lending > IOER).  If those conditions were to materialise, there can be a 
significant acceleration in late cycle growth as banks begin to build up their 
loan leverage.  That is, rather than the usual pattern of higher than potential 
growth in the early part of the cycle, we could have the unusual occurrence of 
higher than potential growth in the late part of the cycle.  That is something that 
conventional macro analysis does not capture and could have significant 
implications for asset prices—both equity and fixed income markets.  This 
inference is also something that is not embedded in yield curve, given its 
extreme flatness.  However, as can be implicitly inferred from the discussion so 
far, it is extremely difficult to extract signals from the yield curve given the 
scale of the QE.     
 
III. Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided a retrospective on the policy response to the 
Lehman crisis.  The massive monetary, credit and fiscal easing in the immediate 
aftermath of the Lehman failure is confirmed to have been the appropriate 
policy response that offset the significant contractionary impulses on the 
economy.  The regulatory drive after the system stabilized had three elements.  
First, viability for the political class demanded swift and strong retribution 
against banks.  Second, regulators faced pressure to make sure it never 
happened again and revamped the rules to reduce the capacity of the banking 
system to engage in regulatory arbitrage.  Finally, regulation forced a 
strengthening of bank capital.  Basel III tightened the screws and forced an 
increase in high quality capital—the ultimate metric of bank strength, as it 
determines how big a hit a bank can take when things go wrong and still be 
viable.  
 
While regulatory pressure has ultimately resulted in stronger banks, the 
transition process led to tight financial conditions over a period of close to 5 
years.  Regulation forced banks to raise high quality capital and deleverage. The 
demand for more liquidity in bank assets and greater stability in liabilities in 
this transition period accentuated the tightness in credit.  That is, financial 
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policy offset some of the extraordinary monetary easing enacted through zero 
interest rates and large scale asset prices by the Fed.   
 
These offsetting forces from monetary and financial policies offer a key 
explanation for the conundrum of why growth has been muted following the 
Great Recession compared to past recoveries and why inflation has been low 
despite the unprecedented monetary easing, rising asset prices and strong labour 
market.  While this conundrum has lasted long—markets have consistently 
overestimated interest rate forwards and monetary policy has systematically 
undershot the Fed’s “dot plots”—the current stronger position of the banks 
implies that the financial headwinds are likely to abate going forward.  A late 
cycle surge in above potential growth—something that rarely happens in an 
economic cycle—is entirely possible if the banks can now kick in with credit.  
Depending on how the inflationary dynamics plays out, that could lead to a 
tighter monetary policy going forward than is currently priced in. 
 
This paper has also documented how the large scale asset purchases 
arising from QE has increased the excess reserves in the banking system.  In 
fact, excess reserves increased from pre-crisis levels by a much larger multiple 
than the Fed’s balance sheet.  While excess reserves indicates the unutilised 
potential for credit intermediation by the banking system, the payment of 
interest on excess reserves by the Fed led to an increase in bank profitability and 
aided bank recapitalisation.  This is in stark contrast to the Eurozone where the 
negative deposit rate on excess reserves acts as a tax on the banking system.  As 
capital constraints on lending become less binding and the economy picks up 
momentum, the excess reserves could provide the fuel for banks to extend credit 
going forward.  This could reinforce potential for late cycle acceleration of 
growth noted above.  
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